Evidence suggests that psychedelics bring about their therapeutic outcomes in part through the subjective or qualitative effects they engender and how the individual interprets the resulting experiences. However, psychedelics are contraindicated for individuals who have been diagnosed with certain mental illnesses, on the grounds that these subjective effects may be disturbing or otherwise counter-therapeutic. Substantial resources are therefore currently being devoted to creating psychedelic substances that produce many of the same biological changes as psychedelics, but without their characteristic subjective effects. (...) In this article, we consider ethical issues arising from the prospect of such potential “nonsubjective” psychedelics. We are broadly supportive of efforts to produce such substances for both scientific and clinical reasons. However, we argue that such nonsubjective psychedelics should be reserved for those special cases in which the subjective effects of psychedelics are specifically contraindicated, whereas classic psychedelics that affect subjective experience should be considered the default and standard of care. After reviewing evidence regarding the subjective effects of psychedelics, we raise a number of ethical concerns around the prospect of withholding such typically positive, meaningful, and therapeutic experiences from most patients. (shrink)

In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan , there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W. The result was better than the somewhat (...) confused information printed by Burnet, even in his 1905 reprint, for W for the other dialogues in vol. I. But in the Sophist as elsewhere in vol. I collations largely due to Dr W. S. M. Nicoll added new facts about all of BDTWP and their correctors, and the search for testimonia largely carried out by Dr E. A. Duke added new facts in that area. A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures on something like 87 occasions , so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places. It needs to be underlined that though Burnet undoubtedly deserved to be regarded as a safe and cautious editor, nevertheless he departed from the primary mss. on average about twice per Stephanus page in this dialogue. Sometimes, of course, testimonia showed him right to do this, but testimonia cover only a quite small part of this dialogue. Otherwise Burnet accepted almost 90 conjectures. For the Politicus the figures are fairly similar; Burnet accepted 22 Byzantine conjectures and 35–40 more modern ones. The new OCT there adds 15 or so more conjectures. (shrink)

The generative AI boom is unleashing its minions. Enterprise software vendors have rolled out legions of automated assistants that use large language model (LLM) technology, such as ChatGPT, to offer users helpful suggestions or to execute simple tasks. These so-called copilots and chatbots can increase productivity and automate tedious manual work. In this article, we explain how that leads to the risk that users' ethical competence may degrade over time — and what to do about it.

This paper discusses the economic, legal, moral, and political difficulties in developing drugs for the developing world. It argues that large, global pharmaceutical companies have social responsibilities to the developing world, and that they may exercise these responsibilities by investing in research and development related to diseases that affect developing nations, offering discounts on drug prices, and initiating drug giveaways. However, these social responsibilities are not absolute requirements and may be balanced against other obligations and commitments in light of economic, (...) social, legal, political, and other conditions. How a company decides to exercise its social responsibilities to the developing world depends on the prospects for a reasonable profit and the prospects for a productive business environment. Developing nations can either help or hinder the pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to exercise social responsibility through various policies and practices. To insure that companies can make a reasonable profit, developing nations should honor pharmaceutical product patents and adhere to international intellectual property treaties, such as the Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement. To insure the companies have a good business environment, developing nations should try to promote the rule of law, ethical business practices, stable currencies, reliable banking systems, free and open markets, democracy, and other conditions conducive to business. Overall, this paper advocates for reciprocity and cooperation between pharmaceutical companies and developing nations to address the problem of developing drugs for the developing world. In pursuing this cooperative approach, developing nations may use a variety of other techniques to encourage pharmaceutical companies to act responsibly, such as subsidizing pharmaceutical research, helping to design and implement research protocols, providing a guaranteed market, and bulk buying. (shrink)

Green bioethics is an area of research and scholarship that examines the impact of healthcare practices and policies on the environment and emphasises environmental values, such as ecological sustainability and stewardship. Some green bioethicists have argued that healthcare providers should inform patients about the environmental impacts of treatments and advocate for options that minimise adverse impacts. While disclosure of information pertaining to the environmental impacts of treatments could facilitate autonomous decision-making and strengthen the patient–provider relationship in situations where patients have (...) clearly expressed environmental concerns, it may have the opposite effect in other situations if makes patients feel like they are being judged or manipulated. We argue, therefore, that there is not a generalisable duty to disclose environmental impact information to all patients during the consent process. Providers who practice green bioethics should focus on advocating for system-level changes in healthcare financing, organisation and delivery and use discretion when bringing up environmental concerns in their encounters with patients. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the concept of public trust in science and offers some guidance for ethicists, scientists, and policymakers who use this idea defend ethical rules or policies pertaining to the conduct of research. While the notion that public trusts science makes sense in the abstract, it may not be sufficiently focused to support the various rules and policies that authors have tried to derive from it, because the public is not a uniform body with a common set of interests. (...) Well-focused arguments that use public trust to support rules or policies for the conduct of research should specify (a) which public is being referred to (e.g. the general public or a specific public, such as a particular community or group); (b) what this public expects from scientists; (c) how the rule or policy will ensure that these expectations are met; and (d) why is it important to meet these expectations. (shrink)

The precautionary principle holds that we should not allow scientific uncertainty to prevent us from taking precautionary measures in response to potential threats that are irreversible and potentially disastrous. Critics of the principle claim that it deters progress and development, is excessively risk-aversive and is unscientific. This paper argues that the principle can be scientific provided that the threats addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and the precautionary measures adopted are reasonable. The paper also argues that one may use (...) epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and explanatory power, to determine whether a threat is plausible, and that one may use practical considerations, such as effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, realism and consistency, to determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable. (shrink)

In America today, the problem of achieving racial justice--whether through "color-blind" policies or through affirmative action--provokes more noisy name-calling than fruitful deliberation. In Color Conscious, K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, two eminent moral and political philosophers, seek to clear the ground for a discussion of the place of race in politics and in our moral lives. Provocative and insightful, their essays tackle different aspects of the question of racial justice; together they provide a compelling response to our nation's most (...) vexing problem.Appiah begins by establishing the problematic nature of the idea of race. He draws on the scholarly consensus that "race" has no legitimate biological basis, exploring the history of its invention as a social category and showing how the concept has been used to explain differences among groups of people by mistakenly attributing various "essences" to them. Appiah argues that, while people of color may still need to gather together, in the face of racism, under the banner of race, they need also to balance carefully the calls of race against the many other dimensions of individual identity; and he suggests, finally, what this might mean for our political life.Gutmann examines alternative political responses to racial injustice. She argues that American politics cannot be fair to all citizens by being color blind because American society is not color blind. Fairness, not color blindness, is a fundamental principle of justice. Whether policies should be color-conscious, class conscious, or both in particular situations, depends on an open-minded assessment of their fairness. Exploring timely issues of university admissions, corporate hiring, and political representation, Gutmann develops a moral perspective that supports a commitment to constitutional democracy.Appiah and Gutmann write candidly and carefully, presenting many-faceted interpretations of a host of controversial issues. Rather than supplying simple answers to complex questions, they offer to citizens of every color principled starting points for the ongoing national discussions about race. (shrink)

The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural (...) kind status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status. (shrink)

Healthy volunteers in biomedical research often face significant risks in studies that offer them no medical benefits. The U.S. federal research regulations and laws adopted by other countries place no limits on the risks that these participants face. In this essay, I argue that there should be some limits on the risks for biomedical research involving healthy volunteers. Limits on risk are necessary to protect human participants, institutions, and the scientific community from harm. With the exception of self-experimentation, limits on (...) research risks faced by healthy volunteers constitute a type of soft, impure paternalism because participants usually do not fully understand the risks they are taking. I consider some approaches to limiting research risks and propose that healthy volunteers in biomedical research should not be exposed to greater than a 1% chance of serious harm, such as death, permanent disability, or severe illness or injury. While this guideline would restrict research risks, the limits would not be so low that they would prevent investigators from conducting valuable research. They would, however, set a clear upper boundary for investigators and signal to the scientific community and the public that there are limits on the risks that healthy participants may face in research. This standard provides guidance for decisions made by oversight bodies, but it is not an absolute rule. Investigators can enroll healthy volunteers in studies involving a greater than 1% chance of serious harm if they show that the research addresses a compelling public health or social problem and that the risk of serious harm is only slightly more than 1%. The committee reviewing the research should use outside experts to assess these risks. (shrink)

John Norton has recently argued that Newtonian gravitation theory (at least as applied to cosmological contexts where one envisions the possibility of a homogeneous mass distribution throughout all of space) is inconsistent. I am not convinced. Traditional formulations of the theory may seem to break down in cases of the sort Norton considers. But the difficulties they face are only apparent. They are artifacts of the formulations themselves, and disappear if one passes to the so-called "geometrized" formulation of the theory.

This essay analyzesexploitation in biomedical research in terms ofthree basic elements: harm, disrespect, orinjustice. There are also degrees ofexploitation, ranging from highly exploitationto minimally exploitation. Althoughexploitation is prima facie wrongful,some exploitative research studies are morallyjustified, all things considered. The reasonan exploitative study can still be ethical isthat other moral considerations, such as theautonomy of the research subject or the socialbenefits of research, may sometimes justifystudies that are minimally exploitative. Calling a research project exploitative doesnot end the debate about the merits (...) of thestudy but invites one to ask additionalquestions about how the study is exploitative,and whether the study is justifiablenevertheless. (shrink)

Financial relationships in academic research can create institutional conflicts of interest because the financial interests of the institution or institutional officials may inappropriately influence decision-making. Strategies for dealing with institutional COIs include establishing institutional COI committees that involve the board of trustees in conflict review and management, developing policies that shield institutional decisions from inappropriate influences, and establishing private foundations that are independent of the institution to own stock and intellectual property and to provide capital to start-up companies.

Those objecting to human DNA patenting frequently do so on the grounds that the practice violates or threatens human dignity. For example, from 1993 to 1994, more than thirty organizations representing indigenous peoples approved formal declarations objecting to the National Institutes of Health's bid to patent viral DNA taken from subjects in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Although these were not patents on human DNA, the organizations argued that the patents could harm and exploit indigenous peoples and violate (...) their cultural values. NIH eventually dropped one of its patent applications.On May 18, 1995, 180 religious leaders, led by biotechnology critic Jeremy Rifkin, held a press conference objecting to DNA patenting in Washington, D.C. In their “Joint Appeal against Human and Animal Patenting,” these leaders decried any attempt to patent nature. Some of the more outspoken members of the Joint Appeal likened DNA patenting to slavery, while others objected to treating human beings as marketable commodities. In his recent book, The Biotech Century, Rifkin rehashed the objections to DNA patenting voiced by members of the Joint Appeal. (shrink)

During a prostate exam, Mr. Watson, age 65, learns that his prostate appears to be abnormal. The family physician conducting the exam, Dr. Kleinman, informs Mr. Watson that he may have prostate cancer. Mr. Watson agrees to a variety of tests, including blood tests, bone scans, ultrasound scanning, and a biopsy. After learning about this possible diagnosis and these tests, Mr. Watson surfs the Web for information about prostate cancer and gathers data from many different sources, including the National Cancer (...) Society, the National Institutes of Health, Johns Hopkins University, the Mayo Clinic, and medicine sites. He also searches for information from medical journals using MEDLINE, visits several chat rooms on prostate cancer, and joins some e-mail lists. He arrives in Dr. Kleinman's office for a follow-up appointment with a stack of material and many questions. Dr. Kleinman is surprised, irritated, and offended. He recommends that Mr. Watson have a prostatectomy followed by radiation, but Mr. Watson does not want this operation. He would rather receive a form of radiation therapy recently approved by the FDA that he learned about through his own research. Dr. Kleinman admits that he does not know much about this new treatment, but he says that he would read up on it and consult an oncologist. (shrink)

An empirical investigation was conducted to determine whether management information systems (MIS) majors, on average, exhibit ethical decision-making processes that differ from students in other functional business areas. The research also examined whether the existence of a computer-based information system in an ethical dilemma influences ethical desision-making processes. Although student subjects were used, the research instrument has been highly correlated with educational levels attained by adult subjects in similar studies. Thus, we feel that our results have a high likelihood of (...) generalization to the MIS professional community. The results indicate that MIS majors exhibit more socially-oriented ethical decision-making processes than non-MIS majors measured by the Defining Issues Test. The results also indicate that the existence of a computer-based information system in an ethical dilemma may influence ethical decision-making processes. The study makes no statement regarding MIS majors making more (or less) ethical decisions. The business ethics literature is reviewed, details of the study are presented, implications for management are considered, and directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

Elselijn Kingma maintains that Christopher Boorse and other naturalists in the philosophy of medicine cannot deliver the value-free account of disease that they promise. Even if disease is understood as dysfunction and that notion can be applied in a value-free manner, values still manifest themselves in the justification for picking one particular operationalization of dysfunction over a number of competing alternatives. Disease determinations depend upon comparisons within a reference class vis-à-vis reaching organism goals. Boorse considers reference classes for a species (...) to consist in the properties of age and sex and organism goals to comprise survival and reproduction. Kingma suggests that naturalists are influenced by value judgments and may rely upon implicit assumptions about disease in their choice of reference classes and goals to determine which conditions are diseased. I argue that she is wrong to claim that these choices cannot be defended without arguing in a circular manner or making certain arbitrary or value-driven judgments. (shrink)

Government food and beverage policies can play an important role in promoting public health. Few people would question this assumption. Difficult questions can arise, however, when policymakers, public health officials, citizens, and businesses deliberate about food and beverage policies, because competing values may be at stake, such as public health, individual autonomy, personal responsibility, economic prosperity, and fairness. An ethically justified policy strikes a reasonable among competing values by meeting the following criteria: the policy serves important social goal; the policy (...) is likely to be effective at achieving those goal; less burdensome options are not likely to be effective at achieving the goals; the policy is fair. (shrink)

Phishing is a fraudulent form of email that solicits personal or financial information from the recipient, such as a password, username, or social security or bank account number. The scammer may use the illicitly obtained information to steal the victim’s money or identity or sell the information to another party. The direct costs of phishing on consumers are exceptionally high and have risen substantially over the past 12 years. Phishing experiments that simulate real world conditions can provide cybersecurity experts with (...) valuable knowledge they can use to develop effective countermeasures and prevent people from being duped by phishing emails. Although these experiments contravene widely accepted informed consent requirements and involve deception, we argue that they can be conducted ethically if risks are minimized, confidentiality and privacy are protected, potential participants have an opportunity to opt out of the research before it begins, and human subjects are debriefed after their participation ends. (shrink)

Discussions on the ethics and regulation of clinical research have a great deal to say about the responsibilities of investigators, sponsors, research institutions and institutional review boards, but very little about the responsibilities of research participants. In this article, we discuss the responsibilities of participants in clinical research. We argue that competent adult participants are responsible for complying with study requirements and fulfilling other obligations they undertake when they make an informed choice to enrol in a study. These responsibilities are (...) based on duties related to promise-keeping, avoiding harm to one's self or others, beneficence and reciprocity. Investigators and research staff should inform participants about their responsibilities during the consent process, and should stress the importance of fulfilling study requirements. They should address any impediments to compliance, and they may provide participants with financial incentives for meeting study requirements. In very rare cases, coercive measures may be justified to prevent immanent harm to others resulting from non-compliance with study requirements. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that endocrine disrupting compounds, such as Bisphenol A, pose challenges for traditional paradigms in toxicology, insofar as these substances appear to have a wider range of low-dose effects than previously recognized. These compounds also pose challenges for ethics and policymaking. When a chemical does not have significant low-dose effects, regulators can allow it to be introduced into commerce or the environment, provided that procedures and rules are in place to keep exposures below an acceptable level. This (...) option allows society to maximize the benefits from the use of the chemical while minimizing risks to human health or the environment, and it represents a compromise between competing values. When it is not possible to establish acceptable exposure levels for chemicals that pose significant health or environmental risks, the most reasonable options for risk management may be to enact either partial or complete bans on their use. These options create greater moral conflict than other risk management strategies, leaving policymakers difficult choices between competing values. (shrink)

When environmental health researchers study hazards in the home, they often discover information that may be relevant to protecting the health and safety of the research subjects and occupants. This article describes the ethical and legal basis for a duty to warn research subjects and occupants about hazards in the home and explores the extent of this duty. Investigators should inform research subjects and occupants about the results of tests conducted as part of the research protocol only if the information (...) is likely to be accurate, reliable, and medically useful. Investigators should warn subjects and occupants about hazards they happen to discover while they are in the home, if a reasonable person would warn the subjects and occupants about those hazards. Investigators should not report illegal hazards discovered in the home to the authorities, unless those hazards constitute abuse or neglect of children or mentally disabled people living in the home. When investigators decide to warn research subjects and occupants about hazards in the home, they should take some steps to help them make effective use of this information, such as providing additional counselling or making a referral for remediation or medical treatment. Investigators should discuss these issues with research subjects during the informed consent process. (shrink)

In this article I defend a rule utilitarian approach to paternalistic policies in research with human participants. Some rules that restrict individual autonomy can be justified on the grounds that they help to maximize the overall balance of benefits over risks in research. The consequences that should be considered when formulating policy include not only likely impacts on research participants, but also impacts on investigators, institutions, sponsors, and the scientific community. The public reaction to adverse events in research (such as (...) significant injury to participants or death) is a crucial concern that must be taken into account when assessing the consequences of different policy options, because public backlash can lead to outcomes that have a negative impact on science, such as cuts in funding, overly restrictive regulation and oversight, and reduced willingness of individuals to participate in research. I argue that concern about the public reaction to adverse events justifies some restrictions on the risks that competent, adult volunteers can face in research that offers them no significant benefits. The paternalism defended here is not pure, because it involves restrictions on the rights of investigators in order to protect participants. It also has a mixed rationale, because individual autonomy may be restricted not only to protect participants from harm but also to protect other stakeholders. Utility is not the sole justification for paternalistic research policies, since other considerations, such as justice and respect for individual rights/autonomy, must also be taken into account. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a broad sketch of the advantages of the debt/atonement approach to punishment. Such an approach is appealing for it can benefit both the victim and the remorseful victimizer. Compared to other theories, it gives a fuller and more unified account of our intuitions about paying debts, doing penance, alleviating guilt, granting forgiveness, and offsetting privileges, pleasures and burdens. The theory also allows us to avoid justifying punishment on the basis of using some (...) people to deter others. And it does all of this while channeling in a positive and productive way the deeply felt vindictive need to "get even." Thus, contrary to the traditional wisdom that justice and revenge are diametrically opposed, providing the former may actually depend upon allowing the latter. (shrink)

This study presents the results of a survey of student satisfaction with electronic discussion boards in a course on the responsible conduct of research (RCR). On a 1–5 scale, the respondents stated that the use of the electronic discussion board was an effective teaching tool (4.71), that it enabled them to get feedback from their peers (4.43), that it helped promote discussion and debate (4.36), that it helped them learn how to analyze ethical dilemmas in research (4.36), and that they (...) would consider using an electronic discussion board, if they ever taught a course themselves (4.76). In their written comments, the respondents indicated that electronic discussion boards are a convenient way of promoting debate and in-depth discussion. These results suggest, but do not prove, that discussion boards can promote debate and discussion in courses on research ethics. Instructors who teach RCR should consider using electronic discussion boards in regular or online courses, and they should consider studying the effectiveness of electronic discussion boards in research ethics education. Although electronic discussion boards cannot replace the face-to-face interaction that occurs in a classroom setting, they may provide a useful medium for the exchange of ideas and opinions online. (shrink)

This article examines the assertion that human embryonic stem cells patents are immoral because they violate human dignity. After analyzing the concept of human dignity and its role in bioethics debates, this article argues that patents on human embryos or totipotent embryonic stem cells violate human dignity, but that patents on pluripotent or multipotent stem cells do not. Since patents on pluripotent or multipotent stem cells may still threaten human dignity by encouraging people to treat embryos as property, patent agencies (...) should carefully monitor and control these patents to ensure that patents are not inadvertently awarded on embryos or totipotent stem cells. (shrink)

The Common Rule is a set of regulations for protecting human participants in research funded by the Department of Health and Human Services, which has been adopted in part by 17 federal agencies. It includes four different subparts: Subpart A, Subpart B, Subpart C, and Subpart D. The Common Rule has not been significantly revised since 1981 although some significant changes may be forthcoming. The Food and Drug Administration has adopted its own regulations for the protection of human participants, which (...) are similar to the Common Rule in many key areas, such as the structure and function of the Institutional Review Board, and the criteria for approving research. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to determine whether consent forms in oncology clinical trials of commercially available treatments inform subjects that they may be able to obtain the treatments being investigated without participating in research. We acquired consent forms from a random sample of U.S. oncology clinical trials in the ClinicalTrials.gov database. We then examined a subgroup of the sample consisting of studies in which the treatments under investigations were commercially available. Less than 20% of the consent forms in (...) that group disclosed to subjects that they may be able to obtain the treatment being investigated without participating in the study . Our results suggest that potential research subjects are frequently not informed about important alternatives to research participation in studies involving commercially available treatments, which is a violation of both ethical and regulatory standards. (shrink)

Unequal treatment of human research subjects is a significant ethical concern, because justice in research involving human subjects requires equal protection of rights and equal protection from harm and exploitation. Disputes sometimes arise concerning the issue of unequal treatment of research subjects. Allegedly unequal treatment occurs when subjects are treated differently and there is a genuine dispute concerning the appropriateness of equal treatment. Patently unequal treatment occurs when subjects are treated differently and there is not a genuine dispute about the (...) appropriateness of equal treatment. Allegedly unequal treatment will probably always occur in research with human subjects due to disagreements about fundamental questions of justice. The best way to deal with allegedly unequal treatment is to promote honest and open discussions of the issues at stake. Research regulations can help to minimize patently unequal treatment by providing rules for investigators, ethical review boards, institutions, and sponsors to follow. However, patently unequal treatment may still occur because the regulations are subject to interpretation. Federal agencies have provided interpretive guidance that can help promote consistent review and oversight of human subjects research. Additional direction may be needed on topics that are not adequately covered by current guidance or regulations. International guidelines can help promote equal treatment of human subjects around the globe. While minor variations in the treatment of research subjects should be tolerated and even welcomed, major ones (i.e. those that significantly impact human rights or welfare) should be avoided or minimized. (shrink)

This paper argues that clinicians are sometimes justified in not testing diagnoses or in not subjecting them to a full battery of tests. In deciding whether to conduct a test, a clinician may consider and weigh several different factors, including her confidence in her initial diagnosis, the specificity and sensitivity of the test, the consequences of making a false diagnosis, the pain, harm, and inconvenience caused by the test, and the costs of the test to the patient and society. This (...) view suggests that diagnoses are fundamentally different from scientific hypotheses in that they are not always subjected to the same evidential standards. (shrink)

The Rational Substance View is a pro-life position which maintains that all humans are moral equals and have a right to life in virtue of their kind membership. Healthy embryos, newborns, children, adults, and as the cognitively impaired all essentially have a root or radical capacity for rationality, though it may not be developed or have its operations blocked. Their being substances with a rational nature is the basis of their moral status and what makes it wrong to kill them. (...) I will argue that the view is committed to some bad biology, and suspect metaphysics, and is unable to escape all the reductios of potentiality. I will offer the Healthy Development View as an alternative to the Rational Substance View. It is a pro-life view that avoids the problematic biology and metaphysics and reductios of potentiality. It understands our rational development to be a contingent rather than an essential trait. (shrink)

In the last 20 years, there has been a sharp increase in the incidence of retractions of articles published in scientific journals, the majority of which are due to research misconduct. In some cases, researchers have revised and republished articles that were retracted due to misconduct, which raises some novel questions concerning authorship. Suppose that an article is retracted because one of the authors fabricated or falsified some data, but the researchers decide to salvage the useable data, make appropriate revisions, (...) and resubmit the article for publication. If the person who committed misconduct has made a significant contribution to the research reported in the revised paper, should they be named as an author to recognize this contribution or should they be denied authorship because they committed misconduct? This is a challenging issue because it involves the confluence of two research ethics domains that are usually dealt with separately, i.e., resolution of authorship disputes and adjudication of misconduct findings, as well as potential conflicts among norms that underlie authorship practices and misconduct adjudication. In this paper, we describe some actual cases involving articles that were retracted for misconduct and republished; review policies from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Committee on Publication Ethics, and top fifteen biomedical journals to determine whether they provide adequate guidance for cases like these; and analyze the ethical and policy issues that may arise in these situations. (shrink)

As we approach the 21st century, the threat of nuclear Armageddon has lessened somewhat, but a new threat has emerged: biological warfare. The splitting of the atom eventually led to the detonation of atomic bombs, and the discovery of DNA may soon lead to the use of genetic weapons. This article argues that the scientific community has a responsibility to help protect the world against the threat of biological weapons.

The idea that the degree of infringement public health interventions have on individual rights should be proportional to the degree of expected benefits has emerged as an influential principle in public health ethics and policy. While proportionality makes sense in theory, it may be difficult to implement in practice, due to the inherent conflict between individual rights and the common good underlying the principle. To apply the proportionality principle to a decision of policy, one must still find a reasonable way (...) of balancing these competing values in light of the available options and empirical evidence. In this article, I consider how the proportionality principle applies to the regulation of dietary supplements and examine some critiques of the current oversight system. I argue that it may be difficult maintain proportional oversight because the risks of dietary supplements vary considerably. Strengthening the regulations may therefore promote an appropriate level of regulation in some cases but lead to overregulation in others. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the ethical issues related to the reporting of suspected abuse or neglect in research involving children. Ethical dilemmas related to reporting child maltreatment are often complex because the rights of children and their adult caregivers may conflict and determinations of abuse or neglect are socially constructed judgments that depend on particular circumstances. We argue that when reporting is legally mandated, investigators must follow the law and report their suspicions to Child Protective Services. When reporting is (...) not legally mandated, investigators still have an ethical obligation to report to help prevent additional maltreatment and allow children to obtain access to services needed to recover from abuse or neglect. We also argue that investigators should include plans and procedures in the research protocol for making reports and training research staff in recognising evidence of child abuse or neglect. Although investigators should report evidence of abuse or neglect that is discovered incidentally, they have no mandate to actively search for such evidence when it is not related to the study’s objectives. Investigators should also inform parents and children about their obligations to report suspected abuse or neglect. (shrink)

The US federal research regulations prohibit informed consent, whether written or oral, from including provisions in which human subjects waive or appear to waive legal rights. We argue that policies that prevent human subjects from waiving legal rights in research can be ethically justified under the rationale of group, soft paternalism. These policies protect competent adults from making adverse decisions about health and legal matters that they may not understand fully. However, this rationale is less defensible if there is a (...) comprehensive compensation for injury programme available in which subjects are asked to waive some legal rights in order to participate in the programme. In this situation, subjects should be allowed to waive some legal rights to obtain the benefits of the programme. (shrink)

While I may have misunderstood certain points in Craig's Molinist theodicy, a careful reading of my article will show that Craig is incorrect in his claim that I have failed to evaluate his proposal on the basis of its asserted standard: plausibility. The heart of my argument is that Craig's theodicy is implausible because it fails to provide a credible explanation of the culpability of all non-believers. In this rejoinder I try to show (1) why an evidentialist exoneration of reflective (...) disbelievers (in Christ) also applies, contra Craig, to the unevangelized; and (2) that an evidentialist account of reflective disbelief is more plausible than Craig's sinful-resistance account. (shrink)

In summary, the question of how to construe the procedure called reversibility cannot be given an absolute answer. No one moral interpretation of the principle is universally applicable, that is, applicable to all moral issues. The decision concerning which to apply cannot be made a priori, but only in context - that is, only when we are faced with a particular moral problem. Moreover, there appears to be no rule which would enable us to choose which version is correct in (...) a particular case. It is a matter of judgment.That the various versions represent a moral progression from lower to higher constructions is debatable. We have seen that the altruism of reversibility3 - the ethic of care - may recommend itself in some personal relations to the point of making either version of reversibility4 irrelevant. Similarly, it is not clear that reversibility3 is always higher than reversibility2. For example, parents in trying to decide what is morally best for a young child should often - in the spirit of the second construction - substitute the judgment of their mature selves for the judgment of the immature self of the child. Moreover, this substitution may not be justifiable in terms of either utility or autonomy.If I seem to have ignored reversibility1 in this discussion that is because I consider it outside morality: it is, if anything, a principle of self-interested calculation. If Baier is correct in holding that we teach children to think morally when we get them to take the standpoint of others, that requires, I believe, getting them beyond the stage of crude reciprocity. If Piaget and Kohlberg are correct in their developmental claims, we cannot immediately teach children reversibility4 but must help them progress through the other two versions. There is some basis for thinking that children can transcend egoism and sympathize with others much earlier than Kohlberg allows - an important consideration in the development of a system of moral education. That point has been pursued by Michael Pritchard in his critique of Kohlberg. Pritchard, p 44. My point is a different one: even granting Kohlberg's theory of development (which asserts, for example, that a particular cognitive ability is required to think like a Kantian), it does not follow that the moral thinking which accompanies the highest cognitive stage is morally superior to the moral thinking which accompanies the lesser cognitive stages. That it is cognitively easier to master reversibility3 than reversibility4 does not settle the question of which is morally superior. Rather than arguing about which moral version of reversibility is morally best- a pointless debate if the desirability of a version is understood as contingent upon appropriateness with respect to context - we should instead celebrate the richness of the concept of reversibility. In teaching students the moral point of view by getting them to put themselves in another's place, we would not be asking them to master a rigid formula, but rather to be sensitive to the decisional context and to make a thoughtful judgment about which version of reversibility is most appropriate to that context. We would not be teaching them either moral relativism or moral absolutism, but the complexity of trying to make a moral decision by applying an ancient and philosophically rich ethical principle. (shrink)

Failure to find an obvious or linear relationship between a developmental experiential factor and a developmental outcome often leads investigators to posit concepts such as “biological preparedness” and “evolved predispositions” that allude to hypothetical geneticmechanisms that may not exist. However, experiential nonlinearities alone may explain the development of certain instinctive behaviors, as shown by studies on alarm call responsivity in mallard ducklings.

Creatio ex nihilo sounds like a philosophical teaching, but philosophy has been utterly unprepared to offer proper expression for an origination which presupposes nothing at all! Yet each of the Abrahamic faiths insists on such an origination, so it proved serendipitous when sufficient contact opened between these diverse religious traditions to allow thinkers to assist one another in what proved to be a shared task—and indeed gain assistance from others as well, as Sara Grant elucidates the sui generis relation between (...) creatures and creator using Shankara's “non‐duality”. With Robert Dobie's help, we shall can find ourselves attaining mutual illumination from witnessing Meister Eckhart and Ibn ’Arabi struggle with the same conundrum, reminding us how we will invariably falsify this crucial relating if we insist on thinking of Creator and creatures as “two things”, inevitably yielding a creator who must be the “biggest of all”. Yet this witness of classical explorers from different traditions may embolden contemporary thinkers to try their hand as well. (shrink)

A host of factors, technical and cultural, have combined in our day to establish the journal article as the genre of philosophical writing. The next step is to collect them in the more available format of a book. Whatever be one’s judgment of the practice, it seems established; and, we think, in the case of Sellars’ offerings, is a fortunate one. One may more readily take the measure of a meticulous and probing philosophical mind by surveying its work over a (...) ten-year span. But a collation of essays is not a book, and one may take issue with the ordering of the chapters. We would suggest, for those beginning to read Sellars, the trilogy of lectures: ‘Being and Being Known’, ‘Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind’, and ‘Grammar and Existence’—in that order. These will give a comprehensive and sufficiently detailed view of his over-all strategy. After them one may either pursue the basic analogy of thought to speech in the systematic and particulate fashion of ‘Truth and “Correspondence”’ and ‘Naming and Saying’, or gain a feel for Sellars’ manner through the applications of the analogy to the questions of ‘Particulars’ and the ‘Synthetic A Priori’. (shrink)

Hundreds of thousands of individuals experience traumatic injuries each year. Some are mild to moderate in nature and patients experience full functional recovery and little change to their physical appearance. Others result in enduring, if not permanent, changes in physical functioning and appearance. Reconstructive plastic surgical procedures are viable treatments options for many patients who have experienced the spectrum of traumatic injuries. The goal of these procedures is to restore physical functioning and reduce the psychosocial burden of living with an (...) appearance that may be viewed negatively by the patient or by others. Even after receipt of reconstructive procedures, many patients are left with residual disfigurement. In some, disability and disfigurement may be so profound that individuals are candidates for vascularized composite allotransplantation procedures, i.e., the transplantation of a vascularized human body part containing multiple tissue types as an anatomical and/or structural unit. This narrative review paper summarizes the literature on the psychosocial burden experienced by those who have visible disfigurement. While many of these individuals experience stigma and discrimination, relatively few studies have employed a stigma framework to understand the psychosocial sequelea. This paper briefly addresses this framework. Last, particular focus is given to the psychosocial issues of individuals with particularly severe injuries who are potential candidates for VCA procedures. (shrink)

Most people think it is wrong to take organs from the dead if the potential donors had previously expressed a wish not to donate. Yet people respond differently to a thought experiment that seems analogous in terms of moral relevance to taking organs without consent. We argue that our reaction to the thought experiment is most representative of our deepest moral convictions. We realize not everyone will be convinced by the conclusions we draw from our thought experiment. Therefore, we point (...) out that the state ignores consent in performing mandatory autopsies in some cases. If readers are willing to give up the permissibility of mandatory autopsies, we then offer some metaphysical arguments against posthumous harm. Drawing upon claims about bodies ceasing to exist at death and Epicurean-inspired arguments against posthumous interests, we make a case for an organ conscription policy which respects fundamental liberal principles of autonomy, bodily integrity, and property. (shrink)

Merker's approach allows the formulation of an evolutionary view of consciousness that abandons a dependence on structural homology – in this case, the presence of a cerebral cortex – in favor of functional concordance. In contrast to Merker, though, I maintain that the emergence of complex, dynamic interactions, such as those which occur between thalamus and cortex, was central to the appearance of consciousness. (Published Online May 1 2007).

Alex Pruss argues that romantic love is a basic form of human love that is properly fulfilled in sex oriented towards reproduction. As a result, homoerotic sexual activity cannot obtain the proper consummation and therefore involves misunderstanding the other person’s nature and the possibility of union with them. Although same-sex sexual activity may feel like a consummation of romantic love, it is wrong to generate such a false experience in oneself or another. Presented is an apparent dilemma for Pruss’s thesis (...) suggesting that either both postmenopausal homosexuals and postmenopausal heterosexuals ought to be allowed to marry for their romantic love is not dysfunctional despite not being oriented towards reproduction, or that matrimony is inappropriate for both groups. I suggest avoiding the dilemma in either of two ways that would allow Pruss to distinguish the infertility of homosexual couples from the infertility of post-menopausal women. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:424 CAN HUME'S USE OF A SIMPLE/COMPLEX DISTINCTION BE MADE CONSISTENT? There is little doubt that Hume equivocates on the distinction between simple and complex impressions and ideas. Sometimes he identifies properties such as colors and shapes as simples. This is what he does, in fact, when he first introduces the distinction: Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex (...) are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other. Later, however, Hume speaks of simples not as qualities (or, of course, as substances) but as objects, i.e., things with properties: it is not red and round that are the simples but the red, round spot. He says, for example: Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that distinction of reason, which is so much talk'd of, and is so little understood, in the schools. Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the body figur'd; motion and the body mov'd. The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above explain'd, that all ideas, which are different, are separable. For it follows from thence, that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable; if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable (T 2425 ). 425 A genuine inconsistency with regard to the simple/complex distinction would have far reaching implications for Hume's system. Even the question concerning his understanding of necessity may be affected. It has been argued, for example, that what Hume believes separates the philosophical relations that are necessary from those that are not is that the former are internal relations. The suggestion is that the doctrine of internal relations, which is inextricably tied to a specific characterization of a simple/complex distinction, provides the essential contrast Hume needs for his ultimate denial that the causal relation is necessary. The consequences are compounded if we also take Robinson to be right in his attempt to reconcile Hume's 'conflicting' statements about causation in terms of the distinction between the natural and philosophical relations. While it is pointless to deny the ambiguity just set out (and, of course, one must remain constantly watchful to determine how Hume is employing the simple/complex distinction in a particular case), I believe a reconciliation of the two positions is still possible and that there is no genuine contradiction in Hume's system over this issue. The principle shift occurs between the distinction presented in logical terms and its presentation in psychological terms. In the latter instance what Hume seems to be worried about is Platonism: a metaphysics that countenances the existence of unexemplif ied qualities. This is most evident in the passage above where Hume, in effect, makes the following argument: if it were the case that (1) what is distinguishable in thought is separable in reality; and (2) figure and body are 426 distinguishable in thought; then it would follow that (3) figure and body are separable in reality. However, (3), i.e., Platonism, is false. But then so must be (2). Hume never deviates from this conclusion and its implications for his model of thought throughout the Treatise. It is this argument, for example, which became the basis for Hume's accusation against Locke's theory of abstraction and the foundation of his own view. So far Hume has it that neither thought nor experience present us with colors and shapes in isolation. This is his psychological point. Yet that need not be seen as conclusive with regard to what is to count as a logical simple. Building on his notion of a distinction of reason, Hume says: Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos 'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards... (shrink)

Phenomenological analysis of the bodiliness of human existence establishes a sense in which human consciousness is prereflectively spatial and located at a particular place, and at the same time a sense in which consciousness detaches itself from its location by reflecting on it and itself. This paper probes a parallel aspect of that self which the reader becomes upon reading and entering the world of three selected fictive narratives: this “reading self,” as it will be called, replicates the structure of (...) real-world consciousness, for the reading self is both located at a specifiable place within each of the three fictive worlds and at the same time floats free of that location without leaving the narrative's world. Although the paper does not claim that the reading consciousness always or necessarily replicates real-world consciousness, it suggests that such replication, when it happens, is significantly related to the reading self's encounter with the fictive characters as both selves and others. To say that the latter are self-transcending selves is to say that the reading self may identify itself with them and move into the story's world; such identification does in fact take place. To say that at the same time the characters remain other selves is to say that the reading self, floating free within the story's world, also experiences a distance between itself and them. Yet this otherness does not turn the fictive characters into objects; that is, their otherness does not imply that they are merely objects to be explained in terms of social or biological forces nor that they are the products of an author's manipulations. Much of the paper is occupied with working out the interaction between the reading self's locatedness and non-locatedness, on the one hand, and the fictive characters' selftranscendence and otherness on the other. (shrink)

The first stage of the human embryonic stem(ES) cell research debate revolved aroundfundamental questions, such as whether theresearch should be done at all, what types ofresearch may be done, who should do theresearch, and how the research should befunded. Now that some of these questions arebeing answered, we are beginning to see thenext stage of the debate: the battle forproperty rights relating to human ES cells. The reason why property rights will be a keyissue in this debate is simple and (...) easy tounderstand: it costs a great deal of money todo this research, to develop new products, andto implement therapies; and private companies,researchers, and health professionals requirereturns on investments and reimbursements forgoods and services. This paper considersarguments for and against property rightsrelating to ES cells defends the followingpoints: (1) It should be legal to buy and sellES cells and products. (2) It should be legalto patent ES cells, products, and relatedtechnologies. (3) It should not be legal tobuy, sell, or patent human embryos. (4) Patentson ES cells, products, and related technologiesshould not be excessively broad. (5) Patents onES cells, products, and related technologiesshould be granted only when applicants statedefinite, plausible uses for their inventions. (6) There should be a research exemption in EScell patenting to allow academic scientists toconduct research in regenerative medicine. (7)It may be appropriate to take steps to preventcompanies from using patents in ES cells,products, and related technologies only toblock competitors. (8) As the field ofregenerative medicine continues to develop,societies should revisit issues relating toproperty rights on a continuing basis in orderto develop policies and develop regulations tomaximize the social, medical, economic, andscientific benefits of ES cell research andproduct development. (shrink)

There has never been a time in history that we have been bombarded with so much information in the media and on the internet, especially information that may inhibit thoughtful reflection. In conte...